in government. If the Austrian writer Robert Jungk promoted future studies as a democratic process from below, the U.S. scientist Herman Kahn sought to influence high politics with his cost-benefit scenarios of the world future in On Thermonuclear War (1960) . Indeed, in the United States, much future studies work came from the military-industrial complex, most notably the RAND Corporation, where Kahn began his career. At RAND, Olaf Helmer and his team developed the Delphi method, an influential technique of anonymous expert surveying conducted over several rounds to bring specialists' views close to consensus, first publicized in 1964. Large-scale planning was another area in which scientific examination of the future was developed and promoted by international organizations, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), for which the prominent representative of technoscientific forecasting Erich Jantsch conceptualized explorative and normative forecasting techniques in 1967.
The 1960s boom in future studies increased awareness that more knowledge about the future produced more uncertainty. Even the scientific forecasters, representing the most quantitative branch of future studies, admitted that their method was able to produce alternative paths of development only for narrow sectors and short-term periods; for example, a reliable demographic forecast of a given state's population could be made for the next thirty years, but only if the factor of migration was excluded. The introduction of more complexity would make any future, even a communist one, essentially uncertain in the long term and, in consequence, knowable and governable only to a limited extent. How could this approach, apparently so disruptive with regard to what was described by James Scott as the Soviet high modernist ambition to rationally plan and control the development of both society and nature, be adopted and used in the Soviet Union?
In this article, I examine these questions through two cases central to the history of Soviet forecasting: the debates about long-term economic planning in the 1960s, and the emergence of social forecasting. I argue that due to its postpositivist epistemology, but also its close relation to the strategically important computer technologies, scientific forecasting was particularly conducive to criticism of Soviet economic planning. Scientific forecasting enabled some actors to reform (at least intellectually) Soviet governance: a demand for glasnost in the circulation of data was posed as a necessary condition for producing valid forecasts as early as the 1960s. 9 Other actors assumed a more complacent approach, seeing the scientific forecasting of society as a tool of surveillance and a shortcut to a political career. I argue that, whether reformative or complacent, Soviet forecasting incrementally undermined the ambition for total, centralized control.
Due to space limitations, this article will briefly introduce the interwar experiments in the development of future studies for the purposes of communist see Tuomo Kuosa, The Evolution of Strategic Foresight: Navigating Public Policy Making (Farnham, 2012 governance, before situating post-World War II future studies as a component of cybernetic governmentality. This will be followed by a longer discussion of debates about forecasting as a tool to improve economic planning conducted at the State Planning Institute (Gosplan) in 1966. 10 These debates were of central importance because they set a formula according to which scientific studies of the future of Soviet society were subordinated to economic planning goals. The article's last section will provide a critical perspective on the contribution of Igor' Bestuzhev-Lada, a Russian scholar who is described in the internal historiography of future studies as the key, pioneering promoter of social forecasting in the Soviet Union. However, Bestuzhev-Lada remains unknown in the histories of Soviet science, even sociology, although he worked at the prominent Institute for Concrete Social Research, which has attracted a lot of historians' attention because of its dramatic fate: the institute sought to rejuvenate Soviet social studies with western sociological theories and as a result was purged and placed under tight ideological control. Bestuzhev-Lada nevertheless looked beyond sociology. Outlining his efforts to dominate the field of social forecasting, I demonstrate how the struggle for the Soviet future turned into a struggle for Soviet future studies.
Knowing and Controlling the Future in Postrevolutionary Russia
Soviet forecasting evolved in close proximity to planning, and their histories are closely intertwined. In Russian historiography, the roots of Soviet forecasting are traced back to the idea of the State Commission for Electrification of Russia (GOELRO) to develop a fifteen-year state plan for the development of electrical infrastructure, launched in 1920. GOELRO planners and engineers became aware that the electricity grid's costly and large-scale infrastructure could not be developed without precise knowledge of the types and locations of the future industries to be served by it. Furthermore, as the plan's implementation extended at least fifteen years, the planning had to anticipate future technology changes.
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The GOELRO project led to the institutionalization of centralized national planning in Soviet Russia and the establishment of a central planning commission (Gosplan), where the first methodological thinking about the future was articulated by the urban planner Vladimir (Rudnev) Bazarov. A childhood friend of the pioneering systems theorist Aleksandr (Malinovskii) Bogdanov, Bazarov was involved in the writing of the first perspective plan {perspektyv-nyiplari), in 1921-29. Convinced that technoscientific development was a continuous process, which could not be wholly determined beforehand, Bazarov published articles claiming that Soviet plans should never specify the means 10. The most influential institutes were those of the Ail-Union Academy of Sciences, Gosplan, and the State Committee for Science and Technology under the Council of Ministers. The Central Institute for Mathematical Economics calculated economic and demographic forecasts, the academy's Computer Center did forecasts on oil and gas procurement and environmental and climate change, labor markets were forecasted by the Institute of International Labor Movement, and the lifestyle and the attitudes of youth were explored at the Institute for Concrete Social Research.
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and ends in minute detail. Instead, the plans should be open-ended "plansprognoses." Indicating that policy measures would be adjusted as the need arose, this approach stated the necessity of an open and flexible framework to govern the future.
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A deep, epistemological question remained, however: could the future be known scientifically? The answer was formulated in the adjacent milieu of the nascent management science (nauchnaia organizatsiia truda, NOT) in the 1910s-20s. One of the first systematic Russian thinkers about the management of the future was the French-educated Valer'ian Murav'ev, a research secretary at the Central Institute for Labor, founded by Aleksei Gastev in Moscow in 1920.
13 Murav'ev's essay "The Mastery of Time as the Key Task in the Organization of Work" (1924) elaborated on the Einsteinian notion of time. For Murav'ev, if time were understood as an expression of the relations between things, it would be possible to know the future by studying these abstracted sequences of material relations. To know the future is to accumulate knowledge about possible configurations of things and their relations and then to sequence these configurations-an immense task, but possible from an epistemological point of view.
14 In a similar way, the knowability of the future was postulated in terms of a theory of developmental cycles, most famously the economist Nikolai Kondrat'ev's idea of long economic waves.
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The future was defined as consisting of both material and social components-technical structures, people, and behavior. An important addition here was behaviorist time control, developed in Russian time and motion studies. Gastev, together with Platon Kerzhentsev, a journalist and member of the communist government, founded the League of Time, which sought to "systematize time" via planning, in 1923, aiming to transform the backward practices of Soviet industries and administration by introducing precision: "Instead of 'maybe'-an exact calculation; instead of 'in some way'-a wellthought-through plan; instead of 'somehow'-a scientific method; instead of 'in some time'-at 20 hours 35 minutes on the 15th of October." 16 Once future configurations were sequenced, they could be controlled, and controlled precisely. Many more examples could be called in to support my case, but the point is that the fundamental set of approaches to temporality in relation to governance emerged in postrevolutionary Russia: the need for flexible planning based on forecasting (at that time a linear statistical extrapolation), a contention that governed objects, be they human bodies, firms, or large-scale technical systems, were fundamentally knowable. No less important was the postulate that no efficient organizing was possible without exact and empirical scientific knowledge.
In retrospect, these innovative efforts were severely limited in their appli- cation and literally short-lived. Soviet planning processes, as detailed by Peter Rutland and then Paul Gregory, remained hopelessly confused, and only fiveyear plans provided some general guidelines, albeit in a highly aggregated manner. 17 Soviet workers remained unskilled and their living conditions were often worse than before the revolution.
18 Soviet management scientists lacked basic equipment to conduct their experiments or to train managers.
19 That many time-motion studies could not be empirically conducted for a lack of stopwatches was one of the lesser concerns: the changing political climate would soon claim the very lives of the scientific time managers. Gosplan was purged in 1937. Murav'ev was sentenced to death on political grounds but died from disease before the execution. Kondrat'ev, Gastev, Kerzhentsev, and Bazarov were executed in 1938-40. Access to their work was forbidden to both the public and specialists. Gastev's and Kerzhentsev's work would be republished in the mid-1960s, but Murav'ev's and Bazarov's would become available in Russian only in the 1990s. Therefore, the post-Stalinist predictive policy sciences-in particular, technology assessment-developed in dialogue with American and western European scholarship rather than within its own, Russian tradition. A fundamental role in opening up a space for this dialogue was played by cybernetics.
Cybernetic Governmentality of the Soviet Future
Scientific forecasting, based on statistical time series and used to identify probabilistic future states of a given process, was part of what I call a cybernetic governmentality. 20 In line with Michel Foucault, I use the concept governmentality to emphasize that state governance should not be reduced to law, formal bureaucracy, and the exercise of power through the external imposition of force. The exercise of governmental power can also be traced in the different intellectual and material techniques of ordering human behavior or the environment. 21 After the war, cybernetics became a significant source of such governmental techniques. Developed by the American mathematician Norbert Wiener during WWII and widely disseminated beginning in the 1940s, cybernetics, a science of communication and control, was first banned 17. Peter Rutland, The Myth of the Plan: Lessons of Soviet Planning Experience (London, 1985) . Gregory suggests that the Soviet economy was in fact guided by shorter-term operational plans. According to him, five-year plans were only "propaganda instruments," used to focus "the population on the bright future." He does not, however, discuss the role of longer-term, fifteen-to twenty-year plans. in 1948 then rehabilitated in the Soviet Union in 1956, eventually being declared the science of governance. In the Soviet Union, cybernetics stimulated the invention of cyberspeak, a policy jargon of advanced socialism, but it also transformed Soviet governance by giving it a new orientation to the future.
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Goal-oriented cybernetic control linked the past, present, and future through feedback loops of free-flowing information, a process that was a world apart from dictatorial goal-setting.
A mechanical universe was replaced with a cybernetic one. The metaphor of workers as cogs in the machine was replaced by one of people as carriers and conductors of information in Soviet governmental discourses. 23 Significantly, the cybernetic notion of "teleological" or purpose-guided behavior rejected Newtonian mechanical causality, because cybernetics referred to an activity that was determined not by past causes but by future goals and regulated through real-time feedback loops. 24 Alongside cybernetics, the systems approach postulated complexity and interconnectivity: no single actor, be it human or machine, could be appropriately controlled without taking into account its multiple links. 25 We need to pause here to stress that Wiener's idea of teleology should not be confused with the Soviet concept tselevoe planirovanie, created in the 1920s and translated in English as "teleological planning," because these are two different approaches that invoke different types of governmentality. According to Stephen Collier, tselevoe planirovanie put a premium on the plan's internal consistency, preferably expressed numerically, and thus promised the illusion of total control over planning instruments and targets.
26 Therefore, tselevoe planirovanie had none of the flexibility of a realtime feedback system as conceptualized by Wiener, designed to respond to the ever-changing environment in order to stay on course.
Furthermore, the intellectualization of control was accompanied by intellectualized work enabled by advances in computer technology. Left-leaning western thinkers warned that automation threatened to make manual labor redundant and to completely transform class-based politics and society. 27 In the 1950s, a group of liberal intellectuals associated with the Congress of Cultural Freedom formulated a vision of a new, postindustrial society based on an economy driven by services and information. 28 By the mid-1950s, the 28. Funded by the CIA, the congress contributed to the discrediting of the leftist movement in the west. However, this did not entirely obstruct the spread of the participants' ideas, such as the idea of a new service and knowledge-production-driven economy by one of the founders of management as an intellectual field, Peter Drucker, in his The Landmarks of Tomorrow (New York, 1959) . In the Soviet context, much more controversial were the ideas articulated by David Bell in his The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion ofPoliti-theory of the scientific-technical revolution (STR) had emerged, according to which technoscience drove both economic growth and social change, leading to major transformations in both state socialist and capitalist societies.
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The Soviets adopted a particular version of the STR articulated by the leftist British scientist and public intellectual John Desmond Bernal back in 1939. 30 One of the underlying reasons for introducing the STR into the Marxist-Leninist version of development was its emphasis on universalism and "peaceful struggle in economics," which was expected to facilitate east-west technology transfer.
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Underscoring the fundamental importance of prediction in controlling complex, goal-oriented processes, this cybernetic governmentality bred new approaches and techniques for extracting knowledge about the future. Obviously, in the Soviet Union, these ideas were subject to careful political censorship. For instance, the western term futurology, coined by the German scholar Ossip Flechtheim in 1943, was not well received; the theory was derided as a bourgeois science, although unlike cybernetics and genetics, it was never completely rejected. Indeed, Flechtheim's call to liberate the future, be it state socialist or capitalist, from technocrats could hardly appeal to the Soviets. Being similarly skeptical about the plural futures studies, the Soviets preferred prognozirovanie, translated into English as "forecasting." Yet western future studies based on quantitative methods were borrowed in piecemeal fashion, making them correspond crudely with dialectic materialism. For instance, in 1969, two influential scientists from the military-industrial complex and promoters of information theory, Germogen Pospelov and Vitalii Maksimenko, pointed out that "the best-known method in our country" was the Delphi method, adding that although it was created at RAND, the method could only be useful in a state socialist regime. 32 These ideological quibbles, however, did little more than disguise the power of scientific forecasting, which was both the medium and the message. 
Forecasting in Service of Centralized Planning?
After Stalin's death, Soviet planners turned their attention back to the western experience of economic governance. During postwar reconstruction, but even more so in response to the Soviet economy's slowing growth, which became evident by the late 1950s, Gosplan grew and professionalized. 33 An important innovation was the 1955 establishment of the Scientific Research Institute of Economics (NIEI), dedicated to macroeconomic problems and the development of normative conceptual foundations for perspective planning.
3 ' 1 One of NIEI's tasks was to learn from similar governmental bodies in the west. In November 1958, NIEI director and prominent economist Anatolii Efimov, together with six colleagues, embarked on a two-week trip to France. There was a good reason for that: the French government put a premium on large-scale and rather centralized planning, and, under Pierre Masse, as commissaire general du Plan, new methods of planning based on long-term forecasting were developed. Thus, in addition to factory visits, Soviet economists learned about political economist Jean Monnet's plans and the work of the commissariat. Back in Moscow, Efimov wrote in his report that French "planning organs naturally need to satisfy themselves with merely making a kind of 'programprognosis,' which is made on the most general level and does not command anyone. It is in this sense that the term 'planning' is used in relation to the French economy." Having labelled this kind of planning "indicative," Efimov continued: "It is clear that under the indicative system of planning, even the most perfect method of making the branches of the economy proportionate cannot guarantee a lawful development of economics." 35 This encounter with French practices of central planning was crucial because it contributed to the establishment of a particular notion of forecasting in the Soviet Union. Forecasting was understood as "failed planning," a compromise and a tool that a weak state planning agency used to coordinate a free market economy, designed to compensate for the absence of central directive-based planning. Accordingly, forecasting was deemed unnecessary in directive-led Soviet economic planning.
And indeed, long-term plans could be and were made without forecasting. The first long-term plan (for fifteen years) was made by Gosplan just before the Nazi invasion in 1941. In the late 1950s, Gosplan produced a twenty-year plan called "a general perspective" for the period 1961-80. 36 Both plans claimed to be based on interbranch balances, which in fact could be classified as a type 33 of forecasting, as it enabled modeling future configurations of the economy. The 1941 plan was, however, merely a conceptual exercise, because there was not a sufficiently developed mathematical method for calculating such a balance. The 1950s plan was no better. The talented economist Emil' Ershov, who would leave later NIEI to become the director of the Central Institute of Mathematical Economics (TsEMI), recalled a complete absence of any methodological literature when he was asked to develop the interbranch balances in the late 1950s. 37 The calculations done for the 1961-80 plan were criticized by both westerners, most famously Wassily Leontief, and Soviet economists. 38 However, predictive methods were necessary for any complex automated systems and, just like cybernetics, which was publicly banned between 1948 and 1955, were developed secretly in the military-industrial complex. In turn, scientific forecasting was first formulated as part of the process of militarytechnology assessment and defense strategy: in the 1940s-50s, complex statistical series extrapolation methods, as well as other methods of decision sciences, were most certainly developed at Soviet military-research institutions. 39 Soviet publications on forecasting in research and development also preceded the ones in economic planning. For instance, in 1964, Voprosy filosofii (The Issues of Philosophy) published the first article about forecasting methods in organizing scientific research, authored by Genadii Dobrov, a Ukrainian scientist who participated in pioneering projects for the development of computers in Kyiv and later established himself as the leading authority on research policy. 40 Memoirs also hint that the spread of forecasting in the Soviet Union resembled that in the United States, where the military control techniques developed at RAND were extended to the civil sector, although Russian historiography remains opaque about this. 41 It was the introduction of a new large-scale technical project that propelled scientific forecasting in Soviet economic planning forward in the late 1950s, just like it did in the 1920s. The breakthrough came when the Soviet government decided to develop Siberian oil and gas fields and build a pipeline to Europe, a project that equaled GOELRO in significance. As a vice chairman of the Council of Ministers and then chairman from 1964, Aleksei Kosygin personally supported this project and was aware that the new technological structure required a longer-term outlook. He was also receptive to the ideas of the prominent Russian computer scientists Germogen Pospelov and Viktor Glushkov, who offered to computerize planning and reorient it to incorporate different methods of forecasting. 42 Furthermore, Kosygin worked in tandem with his son-in-law, Dzhermen Gvishiani, an influential westernizer of Soviet management and mediator of many large east-west trade deals. The 1920s Soviet version of Taylorism was revived and upgraded by Gvishiani, who in 1963 authoritatively announced that "governance was first and foremost a science," claiming that both personal experience and a narrow specialization in engineering were "totally insufficient" in the context of the increasingly complex role of governance and calling for extensive retraining of Soviet managers. 43 Once Khrushchev was ousted, in 1964, and Kosygin climbed up the political hierarchy to become second only to Leonid Brezhnev, the future of Soviet scientific future studies was sealed. Planning was to be optimal, scientific, and based on a wide array of short-and long-term predictions. 44 In his 1965 speech at Gosplan, Kosygin proclaimed that scientific forecasting was the key component of planning, because "planning is a science." Gosplan should from then on supply the republics' governments and companies with scientific forecasts, to be revised in light of local context and sent back to the central planners. 45 Kosygin's notion of forecasting's role in planning would remain set for the next twenty-five years: "Discussions of scientific forecasts need to precede the development of plans for the branches of the national economy.... We need to forecast scientifically the development of every branch of industry to be able to give way in time to the most advanced and progressive developments."
46 From 1965, both Gosplan and the Academy of Sciences institutes began to develop long-term forecasts for economic development. 47 In December 1966, the first open academic meeting dedicated to the conceptual development of long-term planning on the basis of forecasting was organized in Moscow. 48 Arranged at NIEI, this meeting was stormed by enthusiastic crowds of scholars. According to Efimov, the novelty and importance of scientific future studies was "illustrated by the energy with which many comrades attempted to enter this hall. Such Anschlag is normally seen only in grand theater premiers. This is understandable, because the question of long-term prognosis is so exciting for us."
49 Although about 250 participants registered to attend a session on forecasting the national economy, more than 450 showed up; another session on mathematical forecasting was attended by 42 100 persons. 50 The obligatory propaganda dues were paid to the superiority of the Soviet system: the Soviet Union was called "the motherland of planning," and the Gosplan veteran Shamai Turetskii claimed that French planners borrowed the "very essence of forecasting" from Russia. 51 The contention that GOELRO was the root of scientific forecasting was cemented and the speakers invoked the importance of cross-branch forecasting to estimate the future demand for energy many times. The interwar tradition was invoked in the plenary session of this meeting: Gosplan economists referred to the 1920s' achievements in Soviet long-term planning and the debates about the longterm prognoses as if self-evident and well known to all, although the names of Bazarov and Gastev were not mentioned in the verbatim transcripts. 52 All this was probably both ideological and pragmatic. Having established the Soviet forecasting tradition's precedence, it was possible to claim that the government could and should learn from the capitalist experience.
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The archival records of these discussions show that Soviet economists hoped to use this official orientation to promote forecasting as a tool to change ad hoc and nonsystematic Soviet planning in practice. Kosygin himself complained that far too many held the "primitive view" that Gosplan's role was not so much to develop all-union targets but to mechanically glue together the plans using separate proposals from republics. 54 In this context, the use of forecasting was expected to simultaneously discipline and expand the intellectual scope of Gosplan. 55 The meeting discarded the earlier idea of forecasting as failed state planning. If Gvishiani proclaimed that governance was, first, a science, a young economist, Boris Breev, insisted that "governance is not possible without prognosis." 56 In his lengthy talk, Abel Aganbegian, who was then in his mid-30s and later rose to become an economic advisor to Mikhail Gorbachev, pronounced that prognoses were not "a step back from planning," a possible interpretation of Kosygin's formula of forecasting as a stage of preplanning, but "a move deeper." 57 The reformative effect of scientific forecasting was also noted: forecasts explore several alternative directions of development, thus implying that the Soviet future was open to different trajectories. 58 To this, Leonid Kantorovich, the prominent economist and creator of linear planning's input-output methodology, added that the plans should be understood as probabilistic, not deterministic. The economy, he argued, "could not be expected to develop according to the plan," and hence multiple possibilities need always be considered. 59 This "realistic" view was shared by many leading mathematical economists. Ershov, for example, recalled thinking that it would have been the utmost nonsense to expect the five-year plans to be implemented; however, it is important to note that such views could only be voiced in closed, academic discussions and not in public.
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The emphasis on glasnost was perhaps the most striking aspect of these discussions in 1966. An economist argued that the existing forecasts for separate branches, such as carbon fuels, were simply absurd and incorrect, because future development of a particular sector was extrapolated without regard to the changes happening in related sectors. To be able to forecast meant sharing the data horizontally across academic and governmental organizations. Furthermore, the methodology of forecasting, it was argued, demanded that Soviet planners openly face some inconvenient facts: Breev insisted that the current practice of grounding the plans exclusively on "achievements" was gravely misleading. Calling for an "analytical history of national economic planning," he added, somewhat realistically, that this requirement was not expected "to be fulfilled soon."
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The NIEI economists' calls for glasnost did not stop at the data issue. The 1966 meeting went as far as to insist on public discussion of forecasts. To be sure, no one meant involving the general public in the discussions; by public, they were referring to academic experts, thus placing the Soviet future in their preserve. 62 Gosplan economists frankly asserted that forecasting did not challenge the existing power concentration because it was limited to a "small circle of specialists" at the top of government. 63 Nevertheless, this suggestion, albeit clearly elitist, was an important step in questioning the Politburo's monopoly on information. 64 Looking back, it is quite clear that these arguments alone did not translate into action; they did not lead to breaking up the strictly centralized, supervised, and compartmentalized data flows within Gosplan. Although the Academy of Sciences and branch institutes were ordered to develop forecasts pertaining to their respective sectors, they had virtually no access to the data pertaining to other, crucially relevant sectors. The result was methodologically flawed branch studies. Even the most technical and narrow forecasting required a much higher degree of open information flow than the Soviet system was prepared to allow for. In practice, Gosplan remained a medieval fiefdom in which branch decisions continued to be made without any regard to cross-branch effects.
Nevertheless, I suggest that the legitimation and prioritization of scientific forecasting had a domino effect that brought about further changes in Soviet governmentality. One of the reasons was a particular view of the STR, which required the revision of Marxist-Leninist dogmas to accommodate the view that science and technology were no longer a superstructure but a direct driver of social transformation. Society was therefore incorporated into 60 the range of things whose future had to be scientifically examined to ensure effective development of large-scale projects, such as oil and gas fields and computer technologies. Enter social forecasting, a branch of applied sociology that served as both a gate and a bottleneck for Soviet future studies.
Soviet Future Studies, the Bestuzhev-Lada Way
Soviet sociology was fully rehabilitated at about the same time that forecasting was publicly acknowledged as the key methodology of the planning process: the Soviet Association of Sociology was formally recognized in 1966. The history of the first Soviet sociological institution, the Institute for Concrete Social Research (IKSI), established in Moscow in 1968, reveals the importance of prediction in the painstaking search for sure footing on the shaky grounds of communist social science. 66 Social forecasting would later be described as "the most advanced form of governing social relations and processes, which makes it possible to scientifically predict and solve social problems." 67 The problems of Soviet society, in other words, could be anticipated and prevented, but this emphasis on governability and control was explicitly contrasted with the epistemology of forecasting, according to which societal development was probabilistic. If society was governed by random chance, one had to acknowledge that at least some of the aspects of Soviet society's future were beyond knowledge and control. 68 It was this gray zone between the promise of control and the postulation of uncertainty that was used by scholars wishing to escape the strait jacket of Marxist-Leninist development theory.
To be sure, this subversive effect of social forecasting was explicitly addressed and measures were taken to rein it in by specifying the institutional subordination and areas of application: first, the priority of party authority and its directives was asserted; second, social forecasting was strictly subordinated to the needs of economic planning. 69 This was translated in practice in the following way: Future norms and values would be the prerogative of the party ideologues; thus, any normative forecasting would be subject to censorship. Then, social forecasting's primary aim would be to harvest and feed social information needed to formulate performance indicators, enabling the increase in labor productivity and matching consumption needs. Explorative forecasting was allowed within certain limits, as it was recognized that the government should be aware of "really existing" social trends in Soviet society, diverging from ideologically approved values. 70 In line with this, social forecasting's research agenda was placed under the umbrella of the studies of the scientific-technical revolution and scientific-technical progress (STP announcement of the STR, in 1956, was followed by Khrushchev's declaration that the Soviet Union would catch up to and surpass the United States, foreseeing the building of communism in two decades. 71 The STR and STP were recognized as the only legitimate drivers of societal change in addition to the political guidance of the party. As the STR and STP both influenced society and depended on the existing social order, social forecasting studies were to measure the implications of these two aspects. Such studies promised a refreshing complexity and the capacity to formulate research questions beyond Marxism-Leninism. Yet in practice, social forecasting was to a large extent limited to simple statistical studies of the changing structure of labor markets, related education patterns, leisure, and social needs.
To fend off ideological attacks, Soviet sociologists preferred quantitative methods of social forecasting; after all, even Stalin mocked those who claimed that mathematics was also political. Yet it was the subordination to economic planning, entailing a constant demand for social statistics, that provided the institutional rationale for organizing social forecasting as a subdiscipline of sociology. All this, alas, proved to be insufficient to elevate social forecasting to a priority science on a par with cybernetics and systems analysis. At IKSI, this soon became evident. Large in terms of staff, it was as underequipped as the NOT institute in the 1920s: Soviet sociologists lacked enough calculators to work out the effects of the STR. 72 Just like NOT, IKSI would be shaken by severe, although not as violent, political turbulence soon after its establishment. 73 I will now detail how social forecasting sailed through the political turbulences at IKSI, its sails ripped and flopping in the end.
The existing historiography of Soviet social forecasting revolves much around the personality of Igor' Bestuzhev-Lada, one of the few who attempted to institutionalize future studies as a separate discipline in the Soviet Union, but he is also named as the pioneer of world futures studies. 74 into a peasant family in a small Mordovian village called Lada (hence his pen name), about 500 km from Moscow, Bestuzhev-Lada began his academic career as a military historian of the Crimean War in the 1950s. As a young historian, he sought directly to influence governmental policies. For instance, in 1951, Bestuzhev-Lada sent a letter to Stalin suggesting taking away by force those children who were inappropriately reared by their parents in order to educate them as communist citizens in orphanages. Retrospectively, he attributes high significance to this correspondence as an expression of his desire to be useful and serve the central power organs. 75 This striving will mark his later attempts to shape the nascent field of Soviet future studies.
In his many writings, Bestuzhev-Lada explicitly acknowledges his ambition to become a pioneer of, and then a dominant figure in, future studies in Soviet Russia. In his memoir, he recalls wishing to write a science-fiction story on moral communist citizenship. Having consulted the library catalogue section on "Utopian socialism," he found H. G. Wells's Anticipations of the Reaction of Mechanical and Scientific Progress upon Human Life and Thought (1901) and K. E. Tsiolkovskii's "The Future of Earth and Mankind" (1928). These works, claimed Bestuzhev-Lada, gave him the idea that the future could be studied scientifically in the same way as the past. He even insisted on having coined the term futurology in 1956, completely independently of Flechtheim. 76 It is, however, uncertain if he was such a pioneer: Bestuzhev-Lada's first publications in the future studies field appeared in 1967; hence, they postdated both Dobrov's work in technology assessment and Kosygin's call for forecasting. 78 In the mid-1960s, IMRD provided a pocket of relative liberty for highly heterogeneous scholarship, united by its search for ways to bypass communist dogma, and Arab-Ogly was personally interested in forecasting, especially in the field of demography. To get this higher administrative position, Bestuzhev-Lada was ready to sacrifice his academic prestige: at that time, IMRD belonged to the trade union sphere (it became an academy institute only later) and had a lower status than the Institute of History. 80 Nevertheless, for Bestuzhev-Lada to head a unit was a step toward establishing himself as the main authority in the field of Soviet forecasting, and he was not keen on competitors. One of my informants suggested that Bestuzhev-Lada prevented the publication of a book on approaches to prediction authored by several colleagues at IMRD, including Merab Mamardashvili, Aleksandr Zinov'ev, and Oleg Genisaretskii.
81 Bestuzhev-Lada's ambitions were high, and he dreamt about creating a scientific council for forecasting at the Academy of Sciences.
82 Therefore, when academician Aleksei Rumiantsev invited Bestuzhev-Lada to join the newly established IKSI as head of a department {otdel) two years later with the promise of a staff of about seventy, he immediately agreed (and cunningly planned to maintain control of his IMRD unit as a vice chairman).
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In February 1969, Bestuzhev-Lada joined IKSI, only to find that things did not work out as expected. He did not get to chair the promised department with seventy staff members but only a unit with four or five. There was no office space either: in the beginning, the unit held meetings in an apartment in the naukograd (science town) Dubna, outside Moscow. Then, it turned out that Bestuzhev-Lada had to share his research agenda with another influential scholar, Anatolii Zvorykin, the head of a unit for studies of the STR's social consequences, who collaborated closely with several international research programs at UNESCO. IKSI research was increasingly subordinated to the needs of Gosplan, which meant more fiddling with statistics and indicators than Bestuzhev-Lada was intellectually and personally prepared to accept.
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In contrast, Zvorykin seemed to be both more comfortable with the functionalist view of the STR and much better equipped to conduct statistical trend surveys (albeit simple ones).
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It is therefore not surprising that Bestuzhev-Lada was more active not as a researcher but an organizer, seeking to both consolidate Soviet forecasting as an autonomous field and establish links with western future studies. 86 His international contacts dated back to the IMRD stage. In 1967, Robert Jungk and Fritz Baade, prominent institutional entrepreneurs of future studies who would later be involved in Soviet energy forecasts, visited Moscow and met Bestuzhev-Lada at the apartment of Ivan Efremov, a scientist and author of the famous novel The Andromeda Nebula (1957), which describes a global communist society several thousand years in the future. 87 At this meeting, the idea of the World Future Studies Federation was discussed. Inspired by this conversation and seeing a window of opportunity, Bestuzhev-Lada initiated a forecasting section at the Soviet Sociology Association, an initiative that, reportedly, was not welcomed by all members of the board. 88 Nevertheless, Bestuzhev-Lada was included in the Soviet delegations to the World Futures Conference in Oslo (1967) and Tokyo (1970) , but he could not go: according to archival documents, for bureaucratic reasons the Soviet delegation was late and did not participate. 89 In 1969 87. Due to the lack of space, the connections between scientific forecasting and science-fiction writing cannot be addressed in this article; the subject, indeed, merits a study of its own. I will only note that Efremov's biographers appear to have overlooked his international connections with western futurologists, something that might have explained the KGB' s suspicion of Efremov after his death. 01 'ga Eremina and Nikolai Smirnov, Ivan Efremov (Moscow, 2013 93 Although it was supported by the top leaders of the Academy of Sciences and included members of Gosplan, apparently no formal permission from the Central Committee was sought. It has to be added that such informal arrangements were not unusual: even large construction projects were begun without formal permissions in the Soviet Union. 94 The society was headed by the academician Vasilii Parin, a prominent biophysicist who specialized in space research and conducted several studies about future medical developments. 95 In the documents, Bestuzhev-Lada is named as co-organizer of SSF, although he denied having this role and, in line with the prosecutors of SSF, claimed that this organization was used as a vehicle for extending the personal influence of the engineer B. N. Tardov of the Research Institute of the Metallurgical Ministry. 96 In 1969, Tardov, acting as vice president, attempted to formally register SSF as a public all-union organization, governed by an assembly and assuming academic activities, such as conferring academic degrees. In 1970, SSF planned to organize 1,600 events involving 200,000 participants. The problem with SSF, it seems, was not so much the content but the form and scale of its activities: SSF emerged from the bottom up and organized its activities horizontally across the industrial branches and academic institutes.
In June 1971, an investigation was started and the outcomes were severe, although not for everyone. Consumed with anxiety, Parin had a stroke and died before he could be summoned for questioning. Tardov was repressed and moved to Latvia. 97 In contrast, Bestuzhev-Lada made an informal agreement 92. In the 1980s, Rocca painstakingly tried to map the development of the SSF but with little success. Some information about it can be found in Firsov, Istoriia sovetskoi sotsiologii. The current state of knowledge leaves one with a lot of unanswered questions about this initiative.
93. In his autobiography, Bestuzhev-Lada claims that the basis for the spontaneous prognosis conferences and, eventually, the association was his seminar at IMRD in 1967. In May 1968, this committee organized the Public Institute for Social Prognosis, with Bestuzhev-Lada named as director, although he denied that he was appointed to this position. Bestuzhev-Lada was in charge of the organizing of the second congress in scientific prognosis, and Tardov took over when organizing the third congress. Bestuzhev-Lada, "Prognozirovanie," 421-22; Bestuzhev-Lada, Svozhu schety. methodology that signaled the need to embed scientific forecasters structurally in the top decision-making processes. Even Okno v budushchee: Sovremennyeproblemy sotsial'nogoprognozirovaniia (A Window to the Future: The Contemporary Problems of Social Prognosis, 1970), which Bestuzhev-Lada described as the key work done at IMRD, was a superficial introduction to western future studies containing no Soviet data. 109 His main interest was in the development of expert surveys, a version of the Delphi method in which a group of anonymous experts are asked to assess the likelihood of future developments. Their answers are statistically aggregated and circulated within the group, and they then revise their opinions based on this aggregated data. While this technique was clearly problematic-it was unlikely that a Soviet expert would trust a promise of anonymity-it is important to note that here the medium became the message: Bestuzhev-Lada's version of the Soviet future was an intellectual infrastructure, a skeleton of governmental control mechanisms, with forecasters situated close to the signal-issuing center.
Bestuzhev-Lada's studies did not foresee change in Soviet society's future. One telling example can be invoked here. From 1972, Bestuzhev-Lada's unit developed social indicators and forecasted young people's future needs.
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A transcript of an internal discussion reveals that Bestuzhev-Lada built his analysis on the assumption that "people in the 1990s will behave in the same way as today," resulting in a shallow and conservative study. His colleagues disagreed: Shlapentokh suggested that should the environment that satisfied their needs disappear, the needs would disappear too; Lisichkin pointed to the forecasts predicting about 85 percent more new goods in France in 1985 and thus, quite possibly, different needs among young people.
111 Bestuzhev-Lada, however, remained unwilling to use forecasting to reveal the unexpected. His caution to avoid uncovering any new issues is well illustrated by the choice to copy and paste pages and pages on societal problems and future directions from the party programs in his books. 112 Even in the late 1980s, when social value studies were extended to include studies of deviation, such as alcohol and drugs problems, Soviet social forecasting never articulated disruptive social change. Putting a premium on trends and continuity, social forecasting served as a tool for conserving the status quo.
The changes that finally took place were rooted instead in other academic milieus, closer to the heart of economic planning: TsEMI and VNIISI. The names of the participants in the 1966 debate on forecasting surfaced after 1986, most prominently Aganbegian, who became Mikhail Gorbachev's economic advisor. Yet the link between perestroika and the 1960s is found in the 1970s, when economic and technoscientific forecasting became solidly established as an area of east-west cooperation. Equipped with western computers, VNIISI made alternative long-term forecasts and submitted them to the Politburo. 113 Then, economists succeeded in institutionalizing forecasting where Bestuzhev-Lada could not, although this took two decades: in 1986, the Institute of Economics and Forecasting of Technoscientific Progress was formed from several departments at TsEMI on the initiative of Aleksandr Anchishkin, Iurii Iaremenko, and Stanislav Shatalin. From the late 1970s, Soviet environmental scientists and economists began applying their forecasts to model substantially different, alternative Soviet futures. It was none other than Shatalin, in his capacity as economic advisor to Gorbachev, who masterminded combining the expertise of eastern European and western planners to design the restructuring of state socialist economies, the program for which was developed in 1989 and situated at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, in Austria, an institute created under the patronage of Kosygin and Gvishiani. 114 The outcomes, as we now know, exceeded all expectations. One should not, however, resort to the trivial observation of forecasters' failure to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union: rather, this is a perfect demonstration that forecasting is not about foretelling but about forging of a new future.
The search for new intellectual models of governance was a strong feature of de-Stalinization. This article demonstrates that scientific forecasting was an example of such innovation, introduced to rejuvenate the existing practices of Soviet economic planning. The key task of forecasting-to contextualize current and often ad hoc decisions by showing their long-term consequenceswas potent with critique. Yet the critical role of Soviet forecasting cannot be understood through a reductionist binary opposition between party control and resistance: even as a tool to implement party directives, forecasting had subversive effects. 115 To be sure, as Frederic Jameson famously noted, images of the future have long been invoked by critics of the present. 116 But some Soviet forecasting contributed not so much with ready-made images but with a special methodology that clashed strongly with the bureaucratic logic of Soviet planning. Instead of challenging the political dogmas of the command economy and the superiority of state socialism, scientific forecasting incrementally modified the very essence of governance by suggesting that the uncertain outcomes of any policies could never be avoided, thus paving the road for a particular, Soviet version of what Michael Power describes as risk management. 117 
